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455 W. Hamilton Street
Allentown, PA 18101
Counsel for Appellants
Michael J. Kelley, Esq. [ARGUED]
3007 Devereaux Avenue
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_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
The Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections and other officials of the Commonwealth
(collectively “the Commonwealth”)1 appeal the May 29, 2009
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More specifically, the Appellants are the Secretary,
Jeffrey A. Beard; the Superintendent of the State Correctional

2

Order of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania granting William Evans‟s petition for
a writ of habeas corpus and ordering Evans‟s release. The
District Court held that Evans‟s due process rights had been
violated by a change in the calculation of his release date.
For the following reasons, we conclude that the District Court
erred in holding that Evans had a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in a miscalculated release date and further
erred in holding that his due process rights were violated. We
will therefore reverse the District Court‟s order and remand
with the instruction that Evans‟s habeas petition be denied.
I.

Factual and Procedural Background

Evans was arrested in Memphis, Tennessee, on
warrants issued by Lehigh County, Pennsylvania charging
him with rape of minors, and was ultimately convicted of
multiple counts of rape, incest, involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse, and terroristic threats. At the end of the tortuous
route this case has taken, he was left in prison for several
more years than he had long been led to believe he would
serve. The present appeal throws into relief the problems that
even well-intentioned state actors and a conscientious district
court can encounter when a mistake lies hidden for many
years.
Following his extradition from Tennessee, Evans was
committed to Lehigh County Prison on November 6, 1986.
Soon thereafter, he was formally charged by Lehigh County

Institute at Waymart; the District Attorney of Lehigh County;
and the Attorney General of Pennsylvania.
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with the crimes for which he had been arrested.2
On
November 13, 1986, Evans was transferred to Northampton
County, Pennsylvania, and charged with separate counts of
rape. He was tried and convicted on both the charges in
Northampton County and those in Lehigh County and
sentenced on December 6, 1990 and March 21, 1991
respectively. The Pennsylvania Superior Court subsequently
determined that those convictions were so affected with error
that they had to be vacated and new trials granted.
Commonwealth v. Evans, 603 A.2d 608 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
On remand, Evans, who had been incarcerated since
his extradition in 1986, stipulated to non-trial dispositions in
both the case in the Northampton County Court of Common
Pleas (the “Northampton Court”) and the case in the Lehigh
County Court of Common Pleas (the “Lehigh Court”). On
January, 14, 1994, he was sentenced in the Northampton
Court to 10 to 20 years of imprisonment and awarded credit
for time served. He was then, on June 29, 1994, sentenced in
the Lehigh Court to 10 to 20 years of imprisonment to be
served concurrently with the sentence imposed by the
Northampton Court. The sentence imposed by the Lehigh
Court is the only one directly at issue on this appeal. In
2

Evans was alleged to have repeatedly raped and
assaulted three children, aged three, five, and eight, over the
course of a year when the children lived with him. The
details of the crimes are horrific and need not be recounted
here. It is sufficient to note that, at least before us, Evans
does not dispute those details and they comport with the
crimes for which he was later sentenced. The children were
“related to [Evans] and [he was] in a position of care and
trust.” (App. at 134.)
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sentencing Evans, the Lehigh Court stated that he would be
given “credit … as required by law for all time spent in
custody as a result of these criminal charges for which
sentence is being imposed.” (App. at 133.)
A few days later, on July 8, 1994, someone at the
Lehigh Court prepared an administrative form called a “Court
Commitment Form DC-300B” (the “Commitment Sheet”),
recording the effective date of the Lehigh County sentence as
November 6, 1986, which corresponds to the date Evans was
placed in the Lehigh County prison after his extradition. The
Commitment Sheet was not signed by the sentencing judge.
By designating the date of Evans‟s sentence as November 6,
1986, the Lehigh Court was effectively granting credit on the
Lehigh County sentence for Evans‟s time served from
November 6, 1986, forward. That designation, however, ran
afoul of Pennsylvania law because it included credit for time
served that had already been applied to the sentence Evans
was serving on his conviction in Northampton County.3
3

Pursuant to 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9760, “if [a]
defendant is arrested on one charge and later prosecuted on
another charge … credit against the maximum term and any
minimum term of any sentence resulting from such
prosecution shall be given for all time spent in custody under
the former charge that has not been credited against another
sentence.” See also Bright v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 831
A.2d 775, 778 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (holding that
“[s]ection 9760(4) makes it clear that time credit on a
sentence may be granted only when it has not already been
credited toward another sentence”); Doria v. Pa. Dep’t of
Corr., Records Dep’t., 630 A.2d 980, 982 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1993) (holding that presentence custody time in one county
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Later that year, the Department of Corrections
(“DOC”) realized that the Commitment Sheet reflected that
Evans was being given credit for time served on his Lehigh
County sentence from November 13, 1986, to March 20,
1991, even though that time had already been credited to his
Northampton County sentence. The DOC recognized that
Evans was not entitled to such double-crediting and, on
December 28, 1994, wrote the Lehigh Court, advising the
sentencing judge of the problem and saying:
[T]o date, [the Department has] not extended
any duplicative portion of this credit to this
inmate. If your honor agrees that the credit is
not appropriate, then amended commitment
papers from the Clerk of the Court removing the
reference to this credit would be sincerely
appreciated. However, if Your Honor disagrees
with the analysis set forth in this letter and
wishes the Department to apply the full amount
of credit originally indicated for this sentence,
the Department will apply that credit upon
receiving your reply to this letter confirming
your intention.
(App. at 157.) The DOC‟s letter indicated that a copy was
sent to Evans‟s counsel, but Evans claims he never saw it.4
could not be credited toward the additional counties‟
sentences, even if the sentences were ordered to run
concurrently).
4

Despite the DOC‟s letter, approximately six weeks later,
on February 9, 1995, the Commitment Sheet, which had been
issued by the Lehigh Court in 1994 without certification, was
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Nearly eleven years after the imposition of Evans‟s
Lehigh County sentence, the DOC issued a Sentence Status
Summary on April 13, 2005, deducting the credit for time he
served between November 13, 1986, to March 20, 1991,
which had improperly been reflected on Evans‟s Commitment
Sheet.5 After that change, Evans‟s release date was moved
certified. That the Commitment Sheet at first was not signed
by the sentencing judge and did not bear the seal or signature
of the Lehigh Court clerk did not, however, deprive the
document of legal effect. See Boyd v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 831
A.2d 779, 783 n.6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (concluding that
even though a Court Commitment order, Form DC-300B was
completed by a clerk on the court‟s behalf and was not signed
by the sentencing judge, it was not improper for the DOC to
rely on it.).
5

The DOC does not have the “power to change sentences,
or to add or remove sentencing conditions, including credit
for time served; this power is vested in the sentencing court.”
Commonwealth v. Mann, 957 A.2d 746, 749 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2008); see also McCray v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 872 A.2d 1127,
1133 (Pa. 2005) (finding that the DOC is an executive branch
agency and has no duty or power to adjust sentencing
conditions, specifically to award credit for time previously
served). Here, the DOC initially recalculated the maximum
release date, a function arguably beyond its authority, but the
corrected maximum release date was later affirmed by the
trial court‟s issuance of an amended Commitment Sheet. The
DOC and the trial court gave time credit to Evans from the
original arrest on November 6, 1986, to November 12, 1986.
Evans was also awarded credit for the time of the vacated
Lehigh County sentence until the new sentence – March 21,
1991, to June 29, 1994. Accordingly, the time period that
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from November 2006 to March 2011.6 Upon learning of his
amended release date, Evans promptly filed in the Lehigh
Court a pro se petition claiming that the DOC had acted
improperly.
The Lehigh Court denied Evans‟s request that he retain
the credit for time served as reflected on the Commitment
Sheet. An amended Commitment Sheet was issued by the
Lehigh County Clerk on May 25, 2005, changing the
effective date of Evans‟s sentence from November 6, 1986, to
June 29, 1994, and Evans was advised of that change on
June 1, 2005.
Shortly thereafter, on June 24, 2005, Evans filed a pro
se motion to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere, which the
Lehigh Court treated as a petition for relief under the Post
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. §§ 9541-9546. On August 23, 2005, the Lehigh Court
dismissed that PCRA petition as untimely, because Evans had
failed to file the petition within one year of the availability of
PCRA relief.7 On November 17, 2005, Evans responded by
was treated as a duplicate credit contrary to Pennsylvania law
was from November 13, 1986, to March 20, 1991.
6

There is some confusion as to Evans‟s corrected release
date. The revised Court Commitment Sheet reflects March
14, 2011. However, the briefs and the Memorandum of the
Clerk show March 7, 2011. For the purposes of this opinion,
March 14, 2011, will be the controlling date.
7

Under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9545(b)(1), petitions for
relief must be filed within one year of the date the judgment
became final which, in Evans‟s case, was in 1994. However,
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filing a motion to appeal nunc pro tunc, in an attempt to
challenge the effect of the August 23, 2005 order. The
Lehigh Court denied his motion without a hearing. Evans
then appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which
also denied him relief. In its opinion, the Superior Court
noted the “gross untimeliness” of his November 17, 2005
motion to appeal nunc pro tunc and determined that, because
of that, the motion should be treated as a second PCRA
petition. (App. at 181.) Treating it as such, the Superior
Court found it untimely because it was filed more than one
year after the effective date of the PCRA, and Evans had
failed to successfully invoke any of the statutory exceptions
to that timing requirement.8 (Id.)
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9545 became effective on January
16, 1996, which was after Evans‟s judgment had become
final. See Section 3(1) of Act Nov. 17, 1995 (Spec. Sess. No.
1), P.L. 1118, No. 32. Therefore, Evans‟s petition would be
considered timely filed if first filed by January 16, 1997, one
year after the effective date of the Act, not the date of his
judgment. Id.
8

There are three exceptions to the timeliness requirement
which a petitioner must allege and prove. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 9545(b)(1). Those are: “(i) the failure to raise the
claim previously was the result of interference by government
officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the
Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the
Constitution or laws of the United States; (ii) the facts upon
which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner
and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence; or (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right
that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United
States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time

9

Evans next filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.9 He argued,
among other things, that the Lehigh Court lacked jurisdiction
to amend his release date and that the amendment violated his
due process rights. The assigned Magistrate Judge issued a
Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) recommending that
Evans‟s habeas petition be denied because, although the
“Court cannot condone the fact that [Evans] was repeatedly
misled, over a period of eleven years, to believe his sentence
expiration date was in November 2006 … the error [did] not
rise to constitutional proportions.” (App. at 45.) While the
District Court adopted the R & R in part, it ordered Evans‟s
release because it concluded that the DOC and the Lehigh
Court “arbitrarily and capriciously” amended Evans‟s release
date in violation of his due process rights. Evans v. Beard,
639 F. Supp. 2d 497, 511 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
The
Commonwealth‟s timely appeal of that decision is before us
now.

period provided in this section and has been held by that court
to apply retroactively.”
9

That petition was filed on November 30, 2005, but was
put on hold and not addressed by the District Court pending
the Superior Court‟s ruling on Evans‟s then-pending PCRA
petition. The case was removed from administrative suspense
on August 14, 2006.
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II.

Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had jurisdiction over Evans‟s
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.10 We have appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
When a petitioner properly presents federal claims to a
state court, but the state court does not consider the merits of
the federal claims, the deferential standard of review set forth
in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”) is inapplicable.11 See Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct.
10

The R & R recommended that 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1)(D), an exception to the statute of limitations
period for habeas petitions, be applied in this case. That
exception gives inmates one year to file a petition after “the
date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of
due diligence.” Id. The District Court adopted that
recommendation. Before us, the Commonwealth does not
challenge the District Court‟s adoption of the R & R‟s
recommendation that this exception applies. We likewise
agree that it is applicable, because Evans could not have
brought his claim concerning the amendment of the
Commitment Sheet until, of course, the amendment occurred.
11

AEDPA provides: “An application for a writ of habeas
corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted
in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
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1769, 1784 (2009) (holding that “[b]ecause the Tennessee
courts did not reach the merits of [the] claim, federal habeas
review is not subject to the deferential standard that applies
under AEDPA”); cf. Harris v. Ricci, 607 F.3d 92, 96 (3d Cir.
2010) (holding AEDPA applicable when the merits of a
petitioner‟s claim on appeal were adjudicated on the state
level). Instead, Evans‟s federal “claim is reviewed de novo.”
Cone, 129 S. Ct. at 1784. Likewise, because “the District
Court relie[d] entirely on the state court record and [did] not
hold an evidentiary hearing, our review of the District Court‟s
decision is … plenary.” Satterfield v. Johnson, 434 F.3d 185,
190 (3d Cir. 2006).
A writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary form of
relief and is granted only to remedy constitutional error.
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633-34 (1993) (noting
that habeas corpus has been regarded as an extraordinary
remedy and that “[t]hose few who are ultimately successful
[in obtaining habeas relief] are persons whom society has
grievously wronged”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). When there is error of constitutional magnitude, the
question becomes whether that error was harmless or whether
it “had substantial and injurious effect.” Fry v. Pliler, 551
U.S. 112, 116 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). In the latter event, habeas relief may be granted.

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
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III.

Discussion
A.

Procedural Default

Before we examine the merits of Evans‟s due process
claim, we must first consider the Commonwealth‟s argument
that his claim is procedurally barred from federal habeas
review because he did not appeal the dismissal of his first
PCRA petition and the state courts dismissed his second
PCRA petition as time-barred under state law. Both the
Magistrate Judge and the District Court concluded that
Evans‟s claim was not procedurally barred. We will not
disturb the District Court‟s ruling in that regard.
Though the Commonwealth failed to raise the issue of
procedural default in the District Court proceedings or to
object to the R & R‟s conclusion that Evans‟s claim was not
procedurally defaulted, the Commonwealth has not waived its
procedural default argument. While we have the authority to
impose the consequences of waiver in a habeas appeal when
the Commonwealth has not properly asserted a procedural
default defense in its answer to a habeas petition, see Szuchon
v. Lehman, 273 F.3d 299, 321-22 (3d Cir. 2001), we believe
the Commonwealth‟s Amended Response to Evans‟s habeas
petition sufficiently raised the issue for the District Court‟s
consideration.12 Certainly the procedural default issue was
12

We recognize that the Commonwealth‟s procedural
default argument in its Amended Response was prompted by
the Magistrate Judge‟s instruction. That does not alter our
conclusion, however, because a federal court has the authority
to raise the issue of procedural default sua sponte. See
Szuchon, 273 F.3d at 321 n.13.
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squarely addressed by both the Magistrate Judge and the
District Court, and in a manner that did not prejudice Evans
in any way. Additionally, the Commonwealth‟s failure to file
objections to the R & R, in the context of a federal habeas
corpus proceeding, did not result in the loss of the statutory
right to appellate review. See Henderson v. Carlson, 812
F.2d 874, 878-79 (3d Cir. 1987) (declining to adopt a rule
conditioning “appellate review on the existence vel non of
objections to a magistrate‟s report”). Once the District Court
independently reviewed the Magistrate Judge‟s R & R, the
Commonwealth‟s “previous failure to object [became]
irrelevant.” Id. at 879 n.4. Finding no waiver, then, we will
consider the Commonwealth‟s position that Evans‟s due
process claim is procedurally defaulted.
A state prisoner ordinarily must exhaust his federal
claims in state court before seeking habeas relief in federal
court. Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 192 (3d Cir. 2000).
Exhaustion requires a petitioner to “fairly present” his federal
claims to the pertinent state courts before bringing those
claims to federal court. Leyva v. Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 365
(3d Cir. 2007). The exhaustion requirement is deemed
satisfied when a petitioner has presented his claims to the
state courts but the state courts have refused to consider the
claims on the merits based on an independent and adequate
state procedural rule. Holland v. Horn, 519 F.3d 107, 112 (3d
Cir. 2008). In other words, a claim may be exhausted but still
be deemed as defaulted under state law. In that event,
“federal habeas review … is barred unless the prisoner can
demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a
result of the violation of federal law, or demonstrate that
failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental
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miscarriage of justice.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
750 (1991); see Holland, 519 F.3d at 112.
Before a violation of a state procedural rule can
foreclose federal habeas review, the state rule must be
adequate, that is, “firmly established and regularly followed.”
Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 376 (2002) (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted). Even if a state rule itself is
adequate, the “exorbitant application” of the rule may in
exceptional cases render the state ground inadequate to erect a
procedural bar. Id.; see Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 23940 (2d Cir. 2003) (describing factors to consider). In
deciding whether such a state procedural bar is adequate, it is
not enough to say that the rule “generally serves a legitimate
state interest”; rather, the adequacy “is determined with
reference to the „particular application‟ of the rule.” Cotto,
331 F.3d at 240 (quoting Lee, 534 U.S. at 387).
In the current case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
dismissed Evans‟s second PCRA petition as untimely under
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9545(b)(1). That state procedural
rule requires that a PCRA petition, even a second or
subsequent petition, be filed within one year of the date the
judgment becomes final, unless “the facts upon which the
claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could
not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.”
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9545(b)(ii); see Commonwealth v.
Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1270 (Pa. 2007) (construing the socalled “after-discovered evidence” exception). The Superior
Court correctly noted that Evans‟s judgment of sentence
became final years before he filed his second PCRA

15

petition.13
The Superior Court acknowledged Evans‟s
attempt to invoke the exception to the one-year period, but
nonetheless dismissed his PCRA petition as “untimely and
subject to no time of filing exceptions,” without mentioning
any of the events that happened in 2005 – events which
actually formed the basis for Evans‟s due process claim.
(App. at 184.)
Under Pennsylvania law, the after-discovered evidence
exception “simply requires petitioner to prove that there were
„facts‟ that were „unknown‟ to him and that he exercised „due
diligence.‟”14 Commonwealth v. Johnson, 945 A.2d 185, 189
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (quoting Bennett, 930 A.2d at 1270).
Here, it is beyond dispute that the “facts” giving rise to
Evans‟s due process claim were “unknown” to him until
eleven years after he was sentenced. Moreover, even if Evans
had exercised the utmost diligence, he could not have
13

The Superior Court also noted that Evans‟s judgment of
sentence became final prior to the January 16, 1996 effective
date of the statute setting the one-year limit in the PCRA.
Thus, in Evans‟s case, the one-year period expired one year
after the effective date, rather than one year after his
judgment became final in 1994.
14

We emphasize that we do not question whether the
PCRA‟s one-year limit for filing PCRA petitions is adequate.
See Fahy v. Horn, 516 F.3d 169, 189 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting
that § 9545(b)(1) was firmly established and regularly applied
as of November 23, 1998). Rather, our inquiry focuses solely
on the Superior Court‟s refusal to apply the after-discovered
evidence exception to the one-year period in Evans‟s case
specifically.

16

discovered these “facts” because the corrections to the
calculation of his release date did not occur until 2005.
Under these circumstances, the Pennsylvania courts‟
refusal to apply the after-discovered evidence exception is not
an adequate basis to preclude federal habeas review of
Evans‟s due process claim, and thus his due process claim is
not procedurally defaulted.15 We therefore turn to the merits
of his claim.

15

We note that there is an argument that Evans‟s claims
are procedurally barred because his second PCRA petition
was filed on November 17, 2005, more than sixty days after
he learned of the newly-discovered facts. To avoid being
procedurally time-barred, “[a]ny petition invoking an
exception … shall be filed within 60 days of the date the
claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 9545(b)(2). Therefore, Evans‟s second PCRA petition may
be viewed as untimely under that requirement. However, the
second PCRA petition was treated by the Superior Court as
untimely not because it was filed sixty days late but because it
was filed more than one year from Evans‟s sentencing date.
In Holloway v. Horn, we stated that “[a] federal habeas court
is „not bound to enforce a state procedural rule when the state
itself has not done so, even if the procedural rule is
theoretically applicable to [the] facts.‟” 355 F.3d 707, 714
(3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Here, the Superior Court
did not enforce the sixty-day rule even though it was
theoretically applicable. Nor will we.
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B.

Due Process

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits states from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend.
XIV. The core concept of due process is protection against
arbitrary government action. Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998). As that concept has developed, it
has come to have both substantive and procedural
components. Id. at 846. Substantive due process is
implicated if Evans had a cognizable constitutional right to be
released on the date reflected by the original Commitment
Sheet. Cf. id. (“[S]ubstantive due process guarantee protects
against government power arbitrarily and oppressively
exercised.”) (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331
(1986)). Procedural due process is implicated if he had a
liberty interest in his release that cannot be infringed without
procedural protections such as notice and a hearing. Cf.
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846 (“[T]he procedural due process
guarantee protects against „arbitrary takings.‟”) (citing
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972)). We discuss each
of those potential due process claims in turn.
1.

Substantive Due Process

“The substantive component of the Due Process
Clause limits what government may do regardless of the
fairness of procedures that it employs.” Boyanowski v.
Capital Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir.
2000). The “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking” on
what is a fundamental right protected by substantive due
process are “scarce and open-ended.”
Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S 702, 720 (1997) (quoting Collins v. City
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of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). Indeed,
there are inherent risks when “the judicial branch gives
enhanced protection to certain substantive liberties without
the guidance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of
Rights.” Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502
(1977). For that reason, substantive due process “has at times
been a treacherous field.” Id. Therefore, in considering
whether Evans‟s claimed interest is protected by substantive
due process, we must be mindful that the inquiry not devolve
into an exploration of our own policy preferences.
See
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (“We must therefore exercise the
utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in
this field, lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause
be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the
Members of this Court.”) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
To determine whether one has been deprived of
substantive due process, we first “define the exact contours of
the underlying right said to have been violated.” Leamer v.
Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 546 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). While Evans complains of the
delay associated with the change in his calculated release
date, neither the District Court nor the parties have defined
with particularity Evans‟s underlying right, but we understand
him to be asserting that it is a fundamental right to be released
from prison on or about a date certain.16
16

The District Court quoted part of Evans‟s objections to
the R & R as follows: “The amendment of the effective date
of Petitioner‟s Lehigh County sentence 11 years after its
imposition and the resulting revised time credit ruling that
changed Petitioner‟s maximum release date[] from
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Next, because substantive due process protection
“limits what the government may do in both its legislative
and its executive capacities,” and a different analysis is
applicable depending on which capacity is implicated, we
must determine if Evans‟s claim is properly analyzed as one
challenging executive or legislative action. Lewis, 523 U.S.
at 846 (citations omitted). Here, the challenged conduct is
fairly characterized as executive because Evans‟s alleged
injury arises not from any legislative act, but rather from the
DOC‟s delay in seeking correction of the double credit on the
administrative records reflecting his time served.17 Because
Evans‟s claim is directed at executive action, “the threshold
question is whether the [governmental] behavior … is so
egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock
the contemporary conscience.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 n.8;
see also United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of
Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 399-400 (3d Cir. 2003)
(acknowledging that “executive action violates substantive
due process only when it shocks the conscience”).

November 13, 2006 to March 13, 2011 [sic] violated
Petitioner‟s 14th Amendment due process right not to be
subject to unreasonable prejudicial delay in the allocation of
time credit and the determination of the maximum service
date of his sentence.” (App. at 14-15.)
17

The action in question is actually the result of a
combination of steps taken by the DOC and the Lehigh Court,
but what the Court did was spurred by the DOC‟s long delay
in pressing for correction of the Court‟s improper application
of credit for time served.
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What is shocking to the conscience inevitably depends
to a degree on whose conscience is being tested; so, to put it
mildly, the standard has some give in it. That flexibility is
manifested in the context-sensitivity of the standard. See
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 (noting that the measure of what
“shocks the conscience” is not precise); Kaucher v. County of
Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 426 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that “[t]he
question of whether a given action shocks the conscience has
an elusive quality to it” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)). What “shocks in one environment may not be so
patently egregious in another.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850.
Therefore, “our concern with preserving the constitutional
proportions of substantive due process demands an exact
analysis of circumstances before any abuse of power is
condemned as conscience shocking.” Id.
As a general matter, it is governmental “conduct
intended to injure” that is “most likely to rise to the
conscience-shocking level.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849 (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). Conscience-shocking
behavior may also arise in the form of injuries produced by
deliberate indifference, although, where the conduct was not
intentional, it is a “closer call[].” Id. “Negligently inflicted
harm,” by contrast, “is categorically beneath the threshold of
constitutional due process” and will never be conscience
shocking. Id. (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328
(1986)).
Moving past generalities, our analysis here is informed
by reference to specific kinds of executive conduct that have
previously been characterized as conscience-shocking or not.
For example, in United States v. Guevremont, we held that the
correction of an illegal sentence is permissible even if it
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results in an increase in the sentence. 829 F.2d 423, 42728 (3d Cir. 1987). We concluded that, absent judicial
vindictiveness, an increase to make the sentence conform to
the intention of the sentencing judge is constitutional. Id. at
428. Guevremont thus suggests that the correction to Evans‟s
Commitment Sheet, which no one argues was motivated by
judicial vindictiveness though it did result in a longer period
of incarceration than Evans was led to anticipate, is not
constitutionally infirm.
Cases in which inmates have been erroneously
released and then re-incarcerated are also instructive as to
whether the correction of time-served credit in Evans‟s case
“shocks the conscience.” In Vega v. United States, a prisoner,
through no apparent fault of his own, was erroneously
released and proceeded to live as a free man for
approximately two years before he was arrested to serve the
remainder of his sentence. 493 F.3d 310, 313 (3d Cir. 2007).
We concluded that the mistaken release of a prisoner does not
prevent re-incarceration if time remains on the prisoner‟s
sentence.18 Id. at 316. We further addressed the question of
18

In fact, we found that point to be uncontroversial, noting
that courts “generally agree upon the „power of the
government to recommit a prisoner who is released or
discharged by mistake, where his sentence would not have
expired if he had remained in confinement.‟” Vega, 493 F.3d
at 315-16 (quoting White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th
Cir. 1930) (explaining that there is “no doubt” about the
government‟s power to reincarcerate an erroneously released
prisoner)); see also Green v. Christiansen, 732 F.2d 1397,
1399 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that “a ministerial mistake does
not necessarily excuse [an erroneously released prisoner]
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whether due process required credit be given against Vega‟s
prison sentence for the time he was at liberty. Id. at 314-15.
Noting that several courts had decided that “a relatively high
degree of culpability is required to shock the conscience in
this context” and had declined to find due process violations
under similar circumstances, we likewise determined that
denying Vega credit for the time he was at liberty would not
be a due process violation. Id. at 316-17 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Vega demonstrates the high threshold for
finding due process violations, showing that even where a
prisoner had actually been released through no fault of his
own, due process was not violated either by reincarcerating
him or by denying him credit for his time at liberty. 19
from serving the rest of his sentence” where “his sentence
would not have expired had he remained in confinement”).
19

While we could “not find a constitutional basis upon
which to anchor the rule of credit for time spent erroneously
at liberty,” we did hold that, under some circumstances,
common law could provide a basis for a prisoner to receive
credit for time at liberty. Vega, 493 F.3d at 317. In
determining under what circumstances credit should be given,
we explained that there were three interests at stake: a
prisoner‟s right to serve a continuous sentence in a timely
manner, the need to limit the arbitrary use of governmental
power, and the government and societal interest in making
sure a prisoner pays the debt he owes society. Id. at 318.
Balancing those interests, we articulated the following test to
be applied in cases where a prisoner was mistakenly released
and then reincarcerated: a “prisoner is to receive credit for
the time he was at liberty if he can bring forth facts indicating
that he was released despite having unserved time remaining.
The government may then respond to the petition by showing
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Given those precedents and the amorphous character
of the shock-the-conscience test, we do not believe the
Commonwealth‟s actions meet that test here.
The
Commonwealth made a record-keeping mistake and then
corrected it, eliminating the unlawful credit given to Evans on
his Lehigh County sentence. The deep disappointment which
that change no doubt engendered is certainly regrettable, but
that does not make the correction conscience-shocking.
Moreover, unlike the petitioners in the mistaken-release
cases, Evans was still in jail at the time the error in his
sentencing calculations was made. He had not yet tasted
freedom. If the re-incarceration of already-released convicts
does not shock the conscience, then correcting the improper
start date of a sentence for a still-imprisoned convict ought
not.
We do not utterly reject that there might be a
“temporal limit” on a court‟s ability to correct a sentencing
problem. See Baker v. Barbo, 177 F.3d 149, 157-59 (3d Cir.
1999) (denying petition for writ of habeas corpus after
concluding that petitioner‟s due process rights were not
violated because the government had the right to appeal
petitioner‟s sentence, which fell below the statutorily required
minimum, and petitioner‟s expectation of release “could not
have reached that „temporal limit‟ whatever it may be” that
would limit the ability of a court to correct such an illegal

that, either, the imprisoning sovereign was not negligent, or
vicariously negligent, or that the prisoner, in any way,
affirmatively effectuated his release or prevented his reapprehension.” Id. at 323.

24

sentence).20
However, “[a] defendant … does not
automatically acquire a vested interest in a shorter, but
incorrect sentence. It is only in an extreme case that a later
upward revision of a sentence is so unfair that it is
inconsistent with the fundamental notions of fairness found in
the due process clause.” United States v. Davis, 112 F.3d
118, 123 (3d Cir. 1997). This is not such a case. It is wellestablished that a prisoner cannot escape punishment simply
because the court committed an error in passing sentence.
20

In Baker, the habeas petitioner was convicted of a crime
that, under a recent statutory amendment, carried a mandatory
minimum sentence of 25 years to life imprisonment with 25
years of parole ineligibility. 177 F.3d at 152. Mistakenly, the
trial court sentenced Baker to a term of 11 years of parole
ineligibility. Id. Baker appealed his sentence on other
grounds and New Jersey cross-appealed seeking the
imposition of the 25 years parole ineligibility as required by
statute. Id. The trial court granted New Jersey‟s cross
appeal, which Baker challenged in a habeas petition alleging
that sufficient time had passed since the imposition of the
original sentence so as to strip the trial court of its ability to
correct the sentence. Id. at 158. We denied relief because: 1)
“Baker‟s reasonable expectations could not have reached that
„temporal limit‟” because the State sought to correct his
sentence less than two years after its imposition and any
expectation he did have could not have been final because his
case was still on appeal; 2) Baker lacked “a substantial
enough expectation of release”; 3) Baker‟s own appeal
prevented his sentence from being “invested with finality”;
and 4) the State‟s persuasive argument that, absent the
correction, Baker would avoid the statutory minimum
sentence and thus thwart the legislative process. Id.

25

United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940, 946 (3d Cir. 1981)
(citing Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166 (1947)).
Neither should one escape punishment when the error at issue
is not in the sentence itself but only in the record keeping
associated with the sentence.
While the passage of time may be a factor in
determining whether a substantive due process violation has
occurred, our passing references, in dicta, to a temporal limit
cannot be construed on this record to prevent the correction of
an administrative mistake so that a lawful sentence can be
served. Evans has presented no evidence to suggest that the
DOC‟s delay was anything more culpable than negligence or
that the correction of his sentence lacked a sound basis. Cf.
Hawkins v Freeman, 195 F.3d 732, 746 (4th Cir. 1999) (“To
declare the Parole Commission‟s decision so egregious and
outrageous as to shock the contemporary conscience … , we
would have to believe that it was infected or driven by
something much worse -more blameworthy- than mere
negligence, or lack of proper compassion, or sense of
fairness, or than might invoke common law principles of
estoppel or fair criminal procedure to hold the state to its
error.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). There is ample
room for complaint about what happened here, but there is
nothing “so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be
said to shock the contemporary conscience” and hence
constitute a substantive due process violation. Lewis, 523
U.S. at 847 n.8.
2.

Procedural Due Process

Procedural due process governs the manner in which
the government may infringe upon an individual‟s life,
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liberty, or property. Prisoners are not completely deprived of
the protections of the Due Process Clause simply because
they are prisoners. Procedural protections must be afforded
to them before they are stripped of the rights they still retain
while incarcerated. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
558 (1974) (finding that a prisoner must be provided due
process before the revocation of “good time” credit for
misconduct).
In analyzing a procedural due process claim, we must
first “determine whether the nature of the interest is one
within the contemplation of the „liberty or property‟ language
of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d
775, 782 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Although the interests protected by procedural due
process are much broader than those protected by substantive
due process, Bell v. Ohio State Univ., 351 F.3d 240, 249-50
(6th Cir. 2003), if there is no constitutionally protected
interest, our inquiry stops. If, however, we “determine that
the interest asserted is protected by the Due Process Clause,
the question then becomes what process is due to protect it.”
Newman, 617 F.3d at 783 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Evans does not contend that his life or property is at
issue. The question is whether he has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest at stake.
As previously noted,
Evans‟s claimed interest was not defined with particularity,
but it seems clear that the idea being pursued is that, in being
systematically misled as to his true maximum release date,
Evans had a legitimate expectation of being released on a
particular date and his expectation matured into a
constitutionally protected liberty interest.
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According to our precedent, a prisoner holds a liberty
interest triggering due process protection in two instances:
when “state statutes and regulations create a liberty interest in
freedom from restraint that imposes an atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life,” and when “severe changes in
conditions of confinement amount to a grievous loss that
should not be imposed without the opportunity for notice and
an adequate hearing.” Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315,
325 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). We have characterized the first as a “so-called
state-created liberty interest” and the second as a “so-called
independent due process liberty interest.” Id.
a)

State Created Liberty Interest

We are unable to discern a state-created liberty interest
here. Evans entered a plea of nolo contendre to three counts
of rape in the first degree. At the sentencing hearing, the
Lehigh Court imposed the following sentence:
That you undergo imprisonment for a period of
not less than 10 years no more than 20 years …
[a]nd credit be given you as required by law for
all time spent in custody as a result of these
criminal charges for which your sentence is
being imposed … [that] [s]entence shall run
concurrent with any sentence imposed in
Northampton County…[and t]hat you will be
placed on probation for a period of 20 years
under the supervision of the Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole.
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(App. at 133.) The sentence itself is entirely lawful,21 though
the record keeping associated with it was in error. As has
been discussed, the initial Commitment Sheet wrongly
credited Evans for presentence time that had already been
applied to another sentence. That improper application of
credit gave Evans an artificially early start date to his
sentence, which led to the miscalculation of his release date.
Later – unfortunately, much later – the court issued a
corrected Commitment Sheet, which reflected the proper start
date of his sentence.22 That correction necessarily resulted in

21

By specifically stating that credit for time spent in
custody be given “as required by law,” the sentence
recognizes that it could only operate within the bounds of
Pennsylvania law, which would afford Evans credit for time
served that had not already been applied to the earlier
rendered Northampton County sentence.
That is also
reflected by the R & R‟s recommendation, which the District
Court seemed to adopt, that the amendment of the
Commitment Sheet which indicated an unlawful application
of credit for time served did not alter Evans‟s sentence. The
parties do not dispute that holding.
22

In Pennsylvania, if no appeal has been taken, a court
may “modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its
entry.” Commonwealth v. Klein, 781 A.2d 1133, 1135 (Pa.
2001) (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5505). However, the
court retains the “inherent powers to amend its records, to
correct mistakes of the clerk or other officer of the court,
inadvertencies of counsel, or supply defects or omissions in
the record, even after the lapse” of thirty days. Id. (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Moreover, even if
one were to construe the Commitment Sheet as a sentence, a
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a later release date, but it did not amend his sentence beyond
the ten to twenty years which he was always required to
serve. Evans was not stripped of any state-created liberty
interest because state law never entitled him to be released on
the date reflected on the initial Commitment Sheet. Evans
can point to no statutory language limiting the power of the
Commonwealth to correct the credit. There is no regulation
to support the double application of his presentence credit
because such an application is indisputably illegal in
Pennsylvania.
The Supreme Court‟s decision in Jago v. Van Curen,
454 U.S. 14 (1981) counsels against any finding of a state
created liberty interest here. The Court specifically addressed
whether an inmate‟s pre-release expectation of freedom was a
liberty interest deserving procedural due process protections.
Id. at 16-17. The inmate had received a communication from
the Parole Board indicating that he was to be released on
parole. Id. at 15. Before he was paroled, however, he
received notice that his parole was being withdrawn because
the Parole Board had received information that he had been
untruthful throughout his evaluation for parole. Id. The
inmate filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
Id. at 16. That court held that state law was unambiguous and
that the inmate had no protectable interest in a release earlier
“sentencing court can sua sponte, correct an illegal sentence
originally imposed, even after the defendant has begun
serving the original sentence.”
Commonwealth v.
Santone, 757 A.2d 963, 966 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Quinlan, 639 A.2d 1235, 1239 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1994)).
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than his actual release date. Id. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court,
holding that, because the inmate had been notified that the
Parole Board was ordering release, he had “a legitimate
expectation that his early release would be effected” and that
that expectation was a protectable liberty interest. Id. at 17.
The Supreme Court in turn reversed the Sixth Circuit and
held that, although the inmate had suffered a grievous loss
upon the rescission of his parole, he did not have a
protectable liberty interest in his anticipated parole. Id. at 1718.
If there is no protected liberty interest in anticipated
parole, we think it stands to reason that there is likewise no
protected liberty interest in the expectation of release on an
erroneously calculated release date.23 Indeed, Jago faced
much more severe consequences from the state‟s change in
position on parole than Evans did from the correction of his
Commitment Sheet. Jago was promised parole from a
maximum sentence of 100 years, so he effectively went from
23

Jago is factually distinguishable from Evans‟s case in at
least two respects. First, Jago contributed to the demise of his
freedom – he lied in both his parole interview and in his
parole plan. Id. at 15. Evans, on the other hand, was
blameless in the inappropriate application of the double credit
and engaged in no behavior to put that credit in peril.
Second, Jago‟s pre-release expectation of freedom lasted at
most a relatively brief two and a half months, while Evans
was misinformed as to his maximum release date for over
eleven years. These distinctions do not, however, detract
from the basic point concerning a constitutionally protected
liberty interest.
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imminent release to life in prison. Jago, 454 U.S. at 14. In
contrast, Evans was facing approximately four years more
than the Commitment Sheet had led him to believe.
Moreover, the freedom that Jago was trying to claim
was consistent with state law, while Evans‟s claim is not.
That is, there is nothing in the Supreme Court‟s opinion to
suggest that the parole statute pursuant to which Jago was to
be released was somehow contrary to Ohio law, but Evans‟s
claim to be released four years earlier than allowed by his
sentence is plainly contrary to Pennsylvania law. In addition,
Evans and his counsel were present when the Lehigh Court
announced that Evans was only to receive credit for time
served “as required by law.”
The Supreme Court‟s
conclusion that there was no liberty interest deserving of
procedural due process protection in Jago‟s effort to be
released from incarceration on legally proper parole
undermines any argument that Evans has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in being released contrary to
Pennsylvania law. Therefore, if Evans has any liberty interest
at all in an artificially early release date, it is not state-created.
b)

Independent Due Process Liberty

It follows that any liberty interest Evans can claim
must be of the “independent due process liberty interest”
variety. The question, then, is whether the correction of a
Commitment Sheet, eleven years after it was initially issued,
amounted to a severe alteration in the conditions of Evans‟s
incarceration such that due process protections were required.
See Renchenski, 622 F.3d at 325 (concluding that a prisoner‟s
liberty interest can be violated when severe changes in
confinement conditions amount to a grievous loss and are
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made without notice and a hearing).
The answer is
straightforward:
while the administrative correction
increased the period he was confined beyond what he had
expected, it did not at all change the conditions under which
he was confined.
Severe changes in conditions of confinement include,
for example, forced administration of antipsychotic
medication, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-222
(1990), or involuntary transfer to a mental hospital, Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980), or, for a prisoner not
convicted of a sex offense, forced participation in sexoffender therapy, Renchenski, 622 F.3d at 326. Again, there
is no indication that anything changed relating to Evans‟s
conditions of confinement, let alone anything of a magnitude
comparable to the aforementioned examples. Time is of
course important, and we do not minimize the magnitude of
the record keeping mistake and communication blunders that
have brought the case to us, but time is a feature of a sentence
of incarceration, not in itself a condition of confinement, and
the passage of time in this case had no effect on the
conditions Evans was required to endure.
In short, because Evans lacks a constitutionally
protected interest in his expectation of release based on the
misapplied credit for time served, no procedural due process
violation could have occurred.
IV.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons we conclude that the learned
District Judge‟s order granting habeas relief must be reversed
and the case remanded with instruction to deny Evans‟s
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petition. We recognize that, since Evans‟s correct release
date has already come and gone as of March 14, 2011, the
practical effect of denying habeas relief is at this juncture
uncertain, but we leave it to authorities in Pennsylvania to
determine in the first instance whether Evans should remain
on probation or be re-incarcerated.
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